The objective of this study is to analyze the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder on tax avoidance, as well as looking at the role of family ownership, commissioner effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness and external audit quality. This research is a quantitative research using fixed effects model. Sample of this research is 70 firms with an observation period of 2010 until 2013. This study finds that the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder has negative effect on tax avoidance. Other test results show that when a family is the controlling shareholder, entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder do not affect on tax avoidance. Board of commissioner and committee effectiveness proved to weaken the relationship between entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder and tax avoidance. However, the role of external quality audit does not prove to weaken the relationship between the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder and tax avoidance.
INTRODUCTION
The ownership structure of companies in Indonesia tends to be concentrated. Those companies are controlled by few shareholders, hereinafter referred to as controlling shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Siregar, 2007; Diyanty, 2012) . Concentrated ownership canreduce the agency problem between shareholders and management. However, it will create a conflict of interest between controlling shareholder and non-controlling shareholder due to separation of control and cash flow rights through interenterprise pyramid structure or cross-holdings.
According to La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) with the "quite life" theory, which argues that management will avoid both expropriation and legal activities that could increase firm value if either activity requires costly efforts. Badertscher, Katz, and Rego (2013) examined variation in the separation of ownership and control influence on the tax practices of private firms with different ownership structures. They stated that firms with more concentrated ownership and control will reduce tax avoidance due to its risk which can impose significant costs on the firm and will induce risk-averse behavior from the managers.
Improving previous research by McGuire et al. (2011) and Badertscher et al. (2013) Most of public companies in Indonesia are owned by family as the main controlling shareholder (Siregar, 2007; Diyanty, 2012 Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) , corporate income tax rate is a factor to make transfer pricing decisions.
Therefore, the first hypothesis in this study is:
H1: an entrenched controlling shareholder has a positive effect on tax avoidance activities.
Public firm in Indonesia is largely controlled by a single shareholder who among these companies is family and small firm (Claessens et al., 2000; Siregar, 2007; Diyanty, 2012) . In relative terms, a family-owned firm with high ownership is more likely to behave like an individual (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010) . The behavior is due to the separation of ownership and control that will ultimately lead to the agency conflict related to personal interests of controlling shareholders at the expense of the rights of minority shareholders.
According to Desai and Dharmapala (2006) , family owned companies are willing to forgo the benefits of tax savings and ignore tax avoidance rather than incur potential fines and expose the firm to the risk of a bad reputation from audit examination.
According to a research conducted by Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) Francis (2004) studied the audit quality for listed firms because of the separation between owners and managers. As a consequence, there is a need for an independent auditor to promote good corporate governance particularly in term of monitoring activities. Baker and Owsen (2002) also argued that the auditor has a role in improving control of the firm which will be beneficial to all stakeholders and the public in general. This is because external auditors consider good corporate governance when planning the audit. On the other hand, the research related to the relationship between tax aggressiveness (an extreme form of tax avoidance) and external audit quality already exists which previously examined, that Big 4 accounting firm can be helpful in reducing tax aggressiveness by firms (client) through increased monitoring and a higher quality audits (Richardson et al., 2013) . Thus the next hypothesis that can be proposed is:
H5: external audit quality weakens the effect of entrenched controlling shareholders on tax avoidance. PPE it =value of property, plant, and equipmentfor companyi, year t, is divided to value of total asset (t-1); MB it =market-to-book ratiofor companyi, in beginning of year t, is calculated with divide market value of equity to book value of equity.
METHODS

Data Source and Sample Selection
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is tax The ETR and CETR in this study have a value with a range of 0-1 as used in the research by Chen et al. (2010) and Sari (2010) . The companies which have a value of ETR and CETR more than one will be excluded from the sample. A negative value of ETR and CETR are converted to zero value in line with a research by Taylor and Richardson (2014) to avoid problems in the processing of estimate model. The purpose of this selection is to exclude the outliers which will not be comparable to other companies.
Independent Variable
Wedge is used as a proxy to measure independent variable in this study, the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders in the form of expropriation incentive to non-controlling shareholders. Wedge value can be calculated by separating shareholder's control rights and cash flow rights through ownership structure of pyramid or cross-ownership.
Variable Moderation
Family Ownership
Family ownership in this study follows the definition used in the study of Diyanty (2012) which is the ultimate controlling shareholder of an ownership chain. This information is obtained by tracing the shareholders who belong to the same family. Family ownership is measured using a dummy value. 1 is given when the ultimate controlling shareholder is an individual or a family group. Otherwise, the dummy value is 0.
BoCs Effectiveness and Audit Committee Effectiveness
Measurement of BoCs effectiveness and audit committee effectiveness in this study will refer to the research by Hermanwan (2009) which looks at the characteristics (independence, activity, the number of members, and competence) owned by the commissioners and the audit committees.
There are 17 questions to score the effectiveness of oversight function of the audit committee which will consist of two possible answers (good and poor) and three possible answers (good, fair, and poor). The Answer "good" rated will be rated 3, "fair" rated 2, and the "poor" is given a value of 1. On a question that the answer can not be obtained from the company's annual report, it will be rated poor response (value 1). In this study, the score of BoCs effectiveness and audit committee effectiveness is measured using a dummy variable to see the total value of the whole question. This methodology is a replication of the research method by Hermanwan (2009).
External Audit Quality
Companies which are audited by Big4 Accounting In this research, the quality audit is proxied by the size of the public accounting firm, which is rated 1 if the company's annual report is audited by Big 4 and rated 0 if the company's annual report is audited by a firm other than Big4 .
Variables Control
This research model also included a few control variables, namely: return on assets (ROA); leverage; property, plant, and equipment (PPE);
and the market-to-book ratio (MB).
Data Processing and Hypothesis Testing
Testing hypothesis of this study will be done by regression analysis method using the balanced panel data model.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
The population of companies included in this study is companies which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 until 2013.
Total samples in this study consist of 70 companies which made it into 280 firm-year observations (see Table 1 in Appendix). This study used two proxies to measure the level of tax avoidance action, namely ETR (effective tax rate) and CETR (effective current tax rate). Based on Table 2 in Appendix, the average value of ETR is 25% and the average value of CETR is 22%. The percentage shows that the average manufacturing company in Indonesia has a value of effective tax rate which is only slightly different from statutory tax rate.
The maximum and minimum value of wedge non-family owned companies (see Table 2 in Appendix).
The average value of BoCs effectiveness and audit committee effectiveness in the sample are 68%
and 71% respectively (see Table 2 in Appendix).
These percentage shows that the overall function of BoCs and audit committee in the samples have a quite effective internal control mechanism of corporate governance. The average of the external audit quality index in the sample is 44% (see Table 2 in Appendix) which shows that more than half of the sample firms are audited by non-Big 4 accounting firm.
The Relationship between Entrenched Controlling
Shareholders and Tax Avoidance
The result of the tests shows that the discrepancy between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders significantly affects the ETR and CETR in a positive direction (see Table 3 in Appendix Table 4 in Appendix).
Thus, the second hypothesis in this study is not accepted. The family ownership does not have a negative effect on tax avoidance when family ownership was moderating the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholder on tax avoidance.
Family as a controlling shareholder reduces the aggressiveness of tax avoidance possibility due to the low value of wedge in the sample.
Moreover, this phenomenon is believed to have occurred due to the possibility of private benefits received by the controlling shareholder which is greater by tunneling profits to parent company rather than tax savings. Lo et al. (2010) find that ownership concentration in Chinese government has influence in the decision of transfer pricing.
Therefore a company is willing to ignore tax savings to tunnel profits to the parent company.
However, the study of Lo et al. (2010) does not provide evidence which shows the incentives for shareholders to consider tax avoidance or tunneling when they decide to make a transfer pricing.
Analysis of BoCs Effectiveness Influence on
Controlling Shareholders and Tax Avoidance Relationship
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that BoCs effectiveness weakens the influence of controlling shareholder entrenchment effect against tax avoidance. The result showed a positive effect and significant correlation (see Table 4 in Appendix). Thus, the third hypothesis of this study is accepted. Results of this study explained that commissioners could reduce agency conflicts by limiting and monitoring the effectiveness of management or majority owner who can act in their own interest. Table 4 Therefore, audit committees are more likely to influence ETR of the company.
Analysis of Audit Committee
Analysis of External Quality Audit Influence on
Controlling Shareholders and Tax Avoidance Relationship
Hypothesis 5 (H5) states that external quality audit weakens the influence of controlling shareholder entrenchment effect against acts of tax avoidance.
Regression analysis in this study where variable tax avoidance as measured by ETR showed the effect of relationship as negative and significant, while the results of regression analysis where variable tax avoidance as measured by CETR also shows negative relationship but not significant (see Table   4 in Appendix Devano and Rahayu (2006) . In this case, it can be justified as absolutely no violation of the law. Thus, controlling shareholders can make tax avoidance and still be able to enjoy tax benefits themselves without having to share it with non-controlling shareholders and it can be covered with an external quality audit by Big 4 Accounting Firm.
Regression Output Control Variable Analysis
The regression results in this study show variable ROA has significant positive effect on the value of CETR of the company. Variable LEV showed opposite relationship with the initial prediction. Initially, it was predicted that the value of estimated variable LEV will be negatively correlated to effective tax rates (ETR and CETR), but it turns out the regression results showed a positive relationship in accordance with research Sari (2010) .
In the study, Sari (2010) Specification Table: ETR = effective tax rate; CETR = current tax rate; WEDGE = control rights reduced cash flow rights; FAMILY = dummy holdings, worth 1 if the company is family as controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise; EDK =dummy BOCs effectiveness, worth 1 if BOCs effectiveness index score equal to 34 and 0 otherwise; EKA = dummy audit committee effectiveness, worth 1 if audit committee effectiveness index score equal to 22 and 0 otherwise; KAE = dummy external quality audit, value 1 if the company is audited by Big 4 Accounting Firm and 0 otherwise; ROA = return on assets; LEV = leverage; PPE = property, plant, and equipment; MB = market to book ratio. Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 *** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level Specification Table: ETR = effective tax rate; CETR = current tax rate; WEDGE = control rights reduced cash flow rights; FAMILY = dummy holdings, worth 1 if the company is family as controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise; ROA = return on assets; LEV = leverage; PPE = property, plant, and equipment; MB = market to book ratio. Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.0515 *** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level * significant at 10% level Specification Table: ETR = effective tax rate; CETR = current tax rate; WEDGE = control rights reduced cash flow rights; FAMILY = dummy holdings, worth 1 if the company is family as controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise;FAMILY_WEDGE = interaction between FAMILY with WEDGE;EDK =dummy BOCs effectiveness, worth 1 if BOCs effectiveness index score equal to 34 and 0 otherwise; EDK_WEDGE = interaction between EDK with WEDGE;EKA = dummy audit committee effectiveness, worth 1 if audit committee effectiveness index score equal to 22 and 0 otherwise; EKA_WEDGE = interaction between EKA with WEDGE;KAE = dummy external quality audit, value 1 if the company is audited by Big 4 Accounting Firm and 0 otherwise; KAE_WEDGE = interaction between KAE with WEDGE; ROA = return on assets; LEV = leverage; PPE = property, plant, and equipment; MB = market to book ratio.
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